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Abstract
Background: Professional guidelines have addressed ethical dilemmas posed by a few types of nontraditional
procreative arrangements (e.g., gamete donations between family members), but many questions arise regarding
how providers view and make decisions about these and other such arrangements.
Methods: Thirty-seven ART providers and 10 patients were interviewed in-depth for approximately 1 h each.
Interviews were systematically analyzed.
Results: Providers faced a range of challenges and ethical dilemmas concerning both the content and the process
of decisions about requests for unconventional interfamilial and other reproductive combinations. Providers vary in
how they respond — what they decide, who exactly decides (e.g., an ethics committee or not), and how — often
undergoing complex decision-making processes. These combinations can involve creating or raising the child, and
can shift over time — from initial ART treatment through to the child’s birth. Patients’ requests can vary from fully
established to mere possibilities. Arrangements may also be unstable, fluid, or unexpected, posing challenges.
Difficulties emerge concerning not only familial but social, combinations (e.g., between friends). These
arrangements can involve blurry and confusing roles, questions about the welfare of the unborn child, and
unanticipated and unfamiliar questions about how to weigh competing moral and scientific concerns — e.g., the
autonomy of the individuals involved, and the potential risks and benefits. Clinicians may feel that these requests
do not “smell right”; and at first respond with feelings of “yuck,” and only later, carefully and explicitly consider the
ethical principles involved. Proposed arrangements may, for instance, initially be felt to involve consanguineous
individuals, but not in fact do so. Obtaining and verifying full and appropriate informed consent can be difficult,
given implicit familial and/or cultural expectations and senses of duty. Social attitudes are changing, yet patients’
views of these issues may also vary, based on their cultural backgrounds.
Conclusions: These data, the first to examine how clinicians make decisions about unconventional reproductive
arrangements, highlight several critical ethical questions and ambiguities, and variations in clinicians’ responses.
While several professional guidelines exist, the current data highlight additional challenges, and have vital
implications for improving future guidelines, practice, education and research.
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Background
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) are enabling
increasing numbers of adults to consider and pursue un-
conventional reproductive combinations and roles that
often pose ethical challenges for clinicians. Three types
of parental combinations, other than “traditional” ar-
rangements of married heterosexual couples, have been
examined and termed “nontraditional” — gay and les-
bian parents and single parents by choice [1, 2], and are
now commonly accepted in many regions in the US and
other Western countries. However, requests for several
additional types of reproductive arrangements have been
described, including gamete donations between various
combinations of family members, such as to and from
male and female siblings, and mothers and daughters
serving as surrogates for each other [3] — that I here
term “unconventional.”
These various unconventional types of combinations
have received far less attention, and may present chal-
lenges that both resemble and differ from each other.
Sister-to-sister egg donation, for instance, can provide
an important option to many women [4]. For an infertile
female patient who, to have a child, requires a third
party (e.g., an egg donor or gestational surrogate), using
a sister, rather than anonymous third party can allow the
patient to still have a genetic connection with the child,
and dramatically reduce costs. Yet these arrangements can
also pose challenges [4]. Certain other familial arrange-
ments can, however, raise various additional problems
related to real or perceived biological consanguinity, or
confused roles for eventual offspring or others [5, 6]. In-
cest taboos and bans on reproduction between closely-
related individuals are widespread among societies, partly
due to concerns about possible birth defects. As more in-
dividuals seek ART and as costs of gamete (especially egg)
donation and gestational surrogacy remain relatively high,
such patients will no doubt increasingly continue to seek
cheaper, unconventional approaches.
In vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics vary considerably in
whether they accept such unusual combinations, and if
so, which. In 1998, 90% and 80% of US ART clinics
would accept eggs from family members and friends, re-
spectively; and 60% would accept family members’ sperm
[7]. These ART clinic directors were also generally more
restrictive than their clinics’ policies regarding many of
these issues — e.g., 14.8% would personally restrict use
of eggs from family members, which was twice as re-
strictive as their clinics’ policies [7]. Clinic directors may
be more conservative than their clinics’ policies due to
fear of litigation and “dynamics of inter-clinic politics”
[7], raising questions about how clinic policies are cre-
ated, and how often these are followed. In a survey of
US ART program directors, using hypothetical ques-
tions, 67% would allow a male patient’s brother without
children to donate sperm, 29% would allow a male pa-
tient’s father to donate sperm, and 18% would allow a
female patient’s mother to donate eggs [8]. Among US
obstetrician-gynecologists in 2008–2009, regarding non-
traditional arrangements, more generally, 17% would
discourage single parents, and 14% would discourage un-
married or lesbian patients. Male and religious respon-
dents were more than two and three times, respectively,
more likely to discourage ART use by these groups [9].
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) has stated, “The use of intrafamilial gamete do-
nors and surrogates is generally ethically acceptable
when all participants are fully informed and counseled”
[3], but recommends prohibition of two related individ-
uals each providing gametes. A brother donating sperm
to fertilize his sister’s egg, for instance, would be incestu-
ous [3, 10]. Moreover, “Child-to-parent arrangements
are generally unacceptable, and parent-to-child arrange-
ments are acceptable in limited situations” [3]. Other ar-
rangements may appear to outsiders to be incestuous
when that is not in fact the case (e.g., a mother carrying
a fetus for her daughter or a brother donating sperm to
his sister who is, along with her husband, infertile). The
European Society of Human Reproduction and Embry-
ology (ESHRE) has published similar guidelines [11].
Some critics have argued that with intrafamilial dona-
tions and surrogacy, truly voluntary decisions are impos-
sible, due to emotional and financial pressures in families
— family members may feel coerced or unduly influenced
to participate [3]. Moreover, once the child is born, famil-
ial roles and relationships can prove complicated, espe-
cially if the child encounters medical, psychological, or
developmental problems, for which parents may then
blame these arrangements [3]. Dilemmas also arise regard-
ing what to tell the offspring about these relationships.
Hence, ASRM’s Ethics Committee guidelines concerning
use of family members as gamete donors or surrogates
emphasize needs to avoid coercion or undue influence of
family members involved, and needs for caution, especially
with relationships that may trigger questions in others’
minds about possible incest [3]. ASRM also recommends
that clinics develop policies and procedures; that some
combinations may be acceptable while others are not
because of consanguinity or lack of adequate informed
consent; and that providers prohibit child-to-parent do-
nation, carefully counsel and screen all participants,
may deny certain requests, and should have family
members obtain appropriate legal consultation [3].
ASRM also has issued recommendations concerning
age maximums for women using donor eggs [12, 13].
But this organization does not monitor or enforce its
guidelines, and most clinics have been not following
key guidelines from the organization — e.g., concerning
selection of donors and compensation [14].
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Critical questions thus arise of how clinicians in fact
view and make these decisions. A few prior studies have
explored aspects of how providers make decisions about
ethically-challenging areas. Ehrich et al., for instance,
conducted group discussions with staff at one UK clinic,
affiliated with a hospital and partly providing National
Health Service (NHS) treatment, concerning two types
of embryo selection — based on sex and carrier status
— and suggested that these two types of embryo selec-
tion challenged notions of individual autonomy, and that
staff balance patient autonomy against other values.
These researchers argued that a model of “relational au-
tonomy” [15], that emphasizes the socially-embedded,
non-individualism of moral agents [15–17] is more suit-
able than the concept of individual autonomy — though
aspects of this approach have been debated [17]. How-
ever, these researchers did not examine other types of is-
sues that arise in ART clinics, such as unconventional
combinations of potential parents.
Gerrits et al. [18] examined several types of ethically-
sensitive requests addressed by a formal, regularly sched-
uled bi-monthly multi-disciplinary ethics committee in a
Dutch hospital-based infertility clinic at an institution
that has Roman Catholic roots, and is ‘rooted’ in a Cath-
olic community (e.g., where commercial surrogacy and
anonymous sperm donation are strictly forbidden).
These researchers examined 29 requests, including 8 pa-
tients who were carriers of genetic disease, 5 with ser-
ious mental or psychiatric problems, 3 elder men, 3 with
cancer, 2 in unstable relationships, and 8 others, includ-
ing 1 case of a couple where the partners might have a
close consanguineous relationship (though no further
details about this last case were provided). The commit-
tee drew on personal views and ethical principles, up-
held the reproductive autonomy of most couples, and
helped diminish the likelihood that decisions were
shaped by a physician’s individual feelings — seeking
consultation, scientific evidence, more medical informa-
tion, test results, referrals to other clinics, and informed
consent. Yet the array of cases examined — from genetic
disease to psychiatric problems to unstable heterosexual
marriages — vary widely and may thus in fact often be
addressed differently.
Frith et al. interviewed UK clinicians, mostly from 5
clinics affiliated with the NHS and with hospitals, and
found that these providers often had difficulty naming
any “ethical issues” when asked [19]. These authors di-
chotomized ethical concerns that arose into one of two
categories, involving either “controversial”, or “settled
morality” of “mundane” everyday practice; and theorized
that clinicians drew a boundary between these two cat-
egories, to avoid a “take-over” by “outside” influences,
challenges and control [19]. Yet crucial questions arise
of what specific ethical principles and/or issues are
involved in such ethical cases, and how these then get ad-
dressed or resolved — whether other categories or types
of ethical issues surface besides these two (e.g., perhaps re-
lated to the specific content of cases), and if so, what.
Moreover, while these three prior studies on ethical is-
sues in ART examined, respectively, on one clinic in the
UK, one clinic in the Netherlands, and mostly five
clinics in the UK, questions emerge of whether these
processes and decisions may vary across different clinics
and countries, and if so, how. Indeed, in the US, 73.5%
of clinics are not university or hospital affiliated, but
rather are “free standing” [20], and thus may not have
formal ethics committees. Moreover, new types of re-
quests will no doubt emerge as the field and social
norms continue to evolve.
Many critical questions thus remain regarding how
providers in fact view and make decisions about various
types of proposed unconventional parenting arrange-
ments — e.g., what specific kinds of challenges and diffi-
culties they confront, and how they respond to these.
Strikingly, no studies have been published of how pro-
viders in fact perceive and make decisions about these
particular challenges and dilemmas.
Thus, as part of an in-depth qualitative interview study
of ART providers and patients, exploring attitudes and ex-
periences concerning several critical aspects of IVF (e.g.,
sex selection, upper age limits of prospective mothers,
numbers of embryos implanted, reductions of multi-fetal
pregnancies, and insurance coverage [21–25]), issues
concerning unconventional combinations of prospect-
ive parents repeatedly arose, and were thus examined,
given the absence of prior research on this topic. This
paper presents these data, focusing on how providers
make decisions about these issues.
Methods
As depicted in Table 1, and presented elsewhere [21–25],
37 in-depth telephone interviews of approximately 1 h
each were conducted and subsequently analyzed with 27
Table 1 Characteristics of sample
Male Female Total
PHYSICIANS 14 3 17
Physicians who also are patients 0 1 1
Type of Practice
University-affiliated 5 1 6
Private Practice 9 2 11
OTHER ART PROVIDERS (e.g., nurses, mental
health providers)
1 9 10
Other providers who also are patients 0 3 3
PATIENTS 1 9 10
TOTAL 16 21 37
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ART providers and 10 patients. Interviews were systemat-
ically analyzed.
Because no earlier research has been published prob-
ing how IVF providers and patients make decisions
about unconventional combinations of parents, qualita-
tive methods were used, since these can best assay the
full range and types of views, interactions and behaviors
involved, and can inform later quantitative research.
Qualitative methods have been employed successfully to
elucidate key aspects of patient’s views and behaviors
regarding other aspects of ART, including patients’
disclosures of donor eggs [26].
Geertz [27] has encouraged examining aspects of peo-
ple’s lives, contexts, and desires not by imposing theoret-
ical frameworks, but by seeking to grasp individuals’
own perspectives, through their own voices to gather a
“thick description.” In the present study, methods
adapted key aspects of “Grounded Theory” [28] — e.g.,
“constant comparison” of data from different contexts to
gauge differences and similarities, and examine whether
these suggest hypotheses. This approach yields new ana-
lytic categories, and assesses them for reasonableness.
The PI (Principal Investigator) repeatedly considered
how interviewees differed and resembled from each
other, and the cultural, social and medical milieus
and factors involved. Grounded Theory entails both
deductively drawing on frameworks from previous re-
search and theories, and inductively building from the
data to larger patterns and themes.
Participants
Interviewees included 27 ART providers — 17 physi-
cians (MDs) (including 1 physician-patient [MD-PT],
and 10 other providers [OPs] (e.g., mental health pro-
viders and nurses, including 3 other provider-patients
[OP-PTs]) — and 10 patients [PTs]. Recruitment oc-
curred through ASRM meetings, word-of-mouth, and
listservs. Clinicians were recruited, too, through national
ASRM meetings (e.g., mental health professional and
PGD interest groups). The PI approached these at-
tendees to see if they may be interested in enrolling in a
survey. If yes, the PI then sent them details. The major-
ity of those approached agreed to participate. The PI
also used a mental health listserv that includes about 60
clinicians (though some are inactive); 15 replied, and the
first 8 were then enrolled. Interviews were conducted
until “saturation” was achieved (i.e., “the point at which
no new information or themes are observed in the data”
[29]). Respondents came from throughout the US. Cli-
nicians frequently discussed interactions with many
patients and colleagues. Patients often described inter-
actions with clinicians and other patients. Inter-
viewees received a detailed information sheet about
the study, on the basis of which they gave informed
consent verbally over the phone, which the PI then
recorded. Interviews were conducted by phone since
these individuals were located across the US. The IRB
approved this consent procedure.
Instruments
The semi-structured survey/questionnaire (see Table 2 for
sample questions), drew on previous research, and probed
patients’ and clinicians’ perspectives and decisions regard-
ing unconventional combinations of parents, and other crit-
ical aspects of IVF.
Data analysis
Interviews were audio-recorded, and transcriptions and ini-
tial analysis of transcripts were done during the period
when the interviews were held to optimize and inform later
interviews. After all interviews were finished, later analyses
were performed in two parts, primarily by trained research
assistants (RAs) and the PI. First, they independently read
subsets of transcripts to probe factors that affected inter-
viewees’ perspectives, determining recurrent issues which
were then given assigned codes. The PI and RAs read the
interviews, coding portions of text to determine “core”
codes or categories (such as requests for treatment by un-
conventional combinations of prospective parents, and in-
stances of providers making decisions about these cases).
Names of codes were written next to each portion of the
transcript to describe the issues presented. The PI and
RAs then collaborated to integrate these separately-
developed codings into a single framework. A coding
manual was then organized, defining the codes and ex-
ploring any differences until consensus was achieved. New
codes that did not fit into the original framework were ex-
plored, and the codes were adjusted when appropriate.
The PI and RAs then independently analyzed the data
to identify the main sub-codes (or subcategories) and
spectrums of variation in each of the main codes. They
integrated these sub-categories that each coder identified
into a single set of “secondary” categories and a refining set
of core categories. These sub-codes included, e.g., providers’
and patients’ instances of decisions based on “yuck” re-
sponses, and decisions made formally by committee.
Codes and sub-codes were then used in analysis of all
of the interviews. To ensure coding reliability, two
coders analyzed each interview. More than one code was
Table 2 Sample questions for providers
• What challenges do you face in your work as an ART provider?
o How do you address these challenges?
• Have you faced challenges concerning non-traditional combinations
of patients? If so, when and how? What has been difficult about these
situations? What did you do? How did you make these decisions?
• How do you view these issues?
• How have your patients approached these issues?
• Do you have any additional thoughts about these issues?
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used when needed. Differences and similarities between
participants were examined, exploring variations within
categories, and factors involved. Disagreements were
probed through closer examination until consensus was
achieved. Earlier and later codings were regularly com-
pared for accuracy and consistency. Illustrative quotes
appear below to provide readers with a sense of the
range of responses and the richness of the data.
Results
In brief, as outlined in Fig. 1, and described more
fully below, providers faced a range of challenges and
dilemmas concerning both the content and the
process of decisions about requests for unconven-
tional interfamilial and other reproductive combina-
tions. Providers varied in how they responded to such
requests — what they decided, who exactly decides,
and how. These combinations can create and/or raise
the child, and can shift over time — from initial ART
treatment through the child’s birth. Requests for these
arrangements can also vary from fully established to
mere possibilities (e.g., including patients’ contingency
plans — e.g., if one member of the combination dies
before the child reaches 18). In describing these eth-
ically challenging cases, inter-related themes emerged,
concerning the types of cases and the ways these pro-
viders made these decisions, illustrating several issues
simultaneously. Thus, as seen below, the categories




Providers grapple with not only intrafamilial donations, but
a variety of other complex “informal or non-conforming
social relationships” [MD#13] that may be interfamilial
and inter-generational, or socially unusual in other
ways. As this male physician said, “Unusual, nonconform-
ing social relationships are one of the most challenging
issues.” [MD#13]
Providers commonly encounter proposed arrangements
that they had not previously anticipated or considered.
Clinicians may struggle with unusual combinations involv-
ing adults with complex social as well as biological
Fig. 1 Issues concerning how clinicians make decisions about unconventional reproductive arrangements
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connections. Unusual social procreative arrangements
were logistically possible, but could create psychological
and ethical conflicts in the future.
A couple is not divorced, but he’s living and sexually
intimate with another woman, not his wife. He wants
to have a kid with this girlfriend. His wife, however,
will carry the baby. His current girlfriend couldn’t or
didn’t want to carry the baby because she’s a model.
The ex-wife will do it because he’s paying her a ton
of money. But you couldn’t make that up! [MD#13]
Clinicians may thus encounter unanticipated scenarios
about which they have to make decisions. These planned
arrangements can be hard because of concerns that the
roles and responsibilities of the adults involved are un-
clear or can cause confusion.
In unconventional combinations, providers usually ask
for careful legal contracts (“We require them to see law-
yers, and go to counseling, and we require documentation”
[MD#13]); but making these decisions can still be hard.
Patients’ reproductive arrangements can also change
in unexpected ways over time. Clinicians might start
treating a patient who has a relatively conventional ar-
rangement that then becomes unconventional, posing
dilemmas. Members of a couple may become unsure
whether they want to stay together, and/or change their
reproductive wishes and proposed arrangements.
We look at the environment the baby is going to be
brought into — whether that’s going to be stable.
Some women come in; and one cycle they’re sexually
intimate with somebody, and the next cycle, they’re
not sure they still want to be a parent with them. One
month, they do, and the next month, they’ll want
them just as the sperm donor. [MD#13]
Concerns about raising, as well as creating the child
Clinicians face challenges concerning unusual intrafami-
lial combinations of individuals involved in not only cre-
ating, but raising the eventual child. As one female
nurse said,
A 65-year-old professor who is retiring wants us to help
him pick an egg donor, and is going to use a surrogate.
But who’s going to raise this baby? He’s got it all
planned out. He’s going to retire to where his sister
lives, and she’s going to raise it for hm. She is 63, and
knows nothing about this. We say: “No.” [OP#6]
Challenges with informed consent
In these situations, informed consent can pose several
challenges. Family members may agree, not because
they are explicitly coerced, but because of complex
long-standing psychological relationships, involving
perceived moral obligations, familial obligations or
guilt. Inter-generational donation can pose particular
but not unique challenges. As one female mental health
provider described,
A mother gets remarried, wants another baby, and
wants her daughter to be a donor. And the daughter
says “yes,” because she feels she can’t say “no” to
mom. Doctors shouldn’t do upward generational
donation. It’s an informed consent and relationship
issue. Plenty of mothers will do things for their
daughters, but that’s a more natural, motherly act.
Japanese grandmothers carry babies for their daughters
since that country does not approve of egg donation
except in those kinds of situations. [OP#5]
As this interviewee suggests regarding Japanese grand-
mothers, practices and cultural norms regarding these
issues may also vary across cultures, related to differing
laws and moral perspectives.
Still, the full voluntariness and thus autonomy of all
the individuals involved can be hard to gauge com-
pletely, since donors may sense familial expectations or
feel somewhat conflicted, though they may ultimately
still be willing to proceed.
A sister is going to donate for her sister. You meet the
donor sister and she tells you that she doesn’t want to
do it, but “just can’t say ‘No’” to her sister. Or she
tells you that she wants to do it, but she is acting like
she doesn’t. [OP#5]
Clinicians can thus face difficulty and uncertainty in
responding when they sense that one of the participants
may have reservations. Thus, mental health providers
and others can serve important roles, screening donors,
and assessing motivations, to ensure that participation
is wholly voluntary; yet challenges can still surface
because donors may say yes, but nevertheless appear
reluctant or unsure.
In other situations, family members may all fully agree
to a plan; yet providers may nonetheless refuse. In-
formed consent can be necessary, but not sufficient,
since providers may be concerned, too, about the best
interests of the future child, who obviously can’t con-
sent. As one male physician said,
One couple I turned down: the husband was 75 and
the wife was 60 and they wanted to use a gestational
surrogate and select for a male because he did not
have a male offspring. He said, “My daughter will take
care of the baby if something should happen to us.” I
said, “This is not if, but when.” He was a wonderful
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guy. At the age of 75, some neuron fired in his head
and said, “You don’t have a male offspring.” So, he
wanted to get a donor egg and a gestational surrogate,
so he could sire this male child. His daughter agreed
she would take care of the baby. So in effect I’m
producing a child for the 40-year-old-daughter, that’s
going to be sired by his sperm. It was too odd for me,
so we backed out. [MD#2]
This case illustrates several issues. The family mem-
bers may all consent to arrangements that nonetheless
pose several ethical problems. Moreover, providers may
refuse to treat patients due to concerns about not only
creating, but raising the child. Clinicians may also have
difficulty articulating the explicit ethical issues involved,
which may rather simply seem “too odd,” highlighting
how providers may have certain implicit intuitive moral
thresholds, on the basis of which they make decisions,
and may refuse. But they may not be wholly able to define
or articulate these criteria or thresholds in advance, and
instead only or most clearly recognize these limits when
encountering them. In addition, cases may feel unaccept-
able not because of one single aspect, but several together
— in this instance, the age of parents, the sex selection
and the child being raised, at least partly, by another fam-
ily member. This case may appear extreme in certain
regards, but providers often described encountering such
unusual requests, to which they needed to respond.
How to decide
Providers differ in how they make these decisions — who
exactly decides, what criterion they use and how. In con-
fronting these requests, clinicians often face challenges in
determining not only whether to offer treatment, but how
to decide — how to weigh the various considerations
involved — frequently undergoing a process from initial
disgust to more careful assessment, and at times agree-
ment. Clinicians may initially oppose a particular arrange-
ment because they feel intuitive moral revulsion; but they
may later carefully and logically reconsider, explicitly ar-
ticulating and weighing the competing ethical principles
entailed. Providers may feel instinctual moral disgust that
they may only subsequently question. As a female nurse
said, “In some cases, the ‘yuck factor’ will get into play be-
fore they think about it, so they just say, ‘No.’” [OP#6]. For
instance, a man may want to donate sperm to his twin sis-
ter and husband who need both an egg and sperm donor.
This arrangement may initially appear to constitute incest,
but after close analysis, does not:
The patient is in her 40s and single, and needs donor
eggs to conceive. Can she use her twin brother as a
sperm donor? Everybody initially went, “Ewwww.”
Then we went to the ethics committee and hashed it
out. We all said, “Well, why not?” It was her gene
pool. It wasn’t incest.” She was using donor eggs, and
her brother and his wife were very accommodating.
She gave birth to a baby fathered by her brother, and
it was lovely. [OP#6]
Providers may thus undergo a process over time in
coming to accept certain types of arrangements. More-
over, this provider, working in a medical center-affiliated
clinic, consulted an ethics committee, though providers
in private free-standing clinics tended not to do so.
Many clinicians may try to address these issues logic-
ally and systematically, going through very clear and
rigorous evaluative steps, but may nonetheless still draw
at least partly on instinct, and use “the smell test.” As a
male physician explained,
First, we ask if this is medically reasonable. Then, is
it in the best interest of each patient? Thirdly, is it in
the best interest of the child? Fourthly, does it pass a
smell test in our profession? Fifthly, how does it relate
to practice and ethical guidelines? Sixth, does it make
sense for us as a practice to do this, or should we
send them somewhere else? Then, what kinds of
medical, psychological, financial, legal management,
are we going to need? And ethics problems. So, we go
through all those aspects, and try to determine what
to do. Eight out of 10 times, we tell people, “If you do
these things, then we’ll be happy to provide service.
But if you don’t want to do these things, we can’t
provide you this service.” [MD#4]
In other cases, initial moral intuitions and the “yuck”
factor may nonetheless prevail. For instance, regarding
the case mentioned above of the request of a 75-year-old
man and his 60-year-old wife for a male child whom the
couple’s daughter would eventually raise, the physician
was sympathetic, but torn. This male doctor continued,
I would describe myself, politically, as closest to being
libertarian — who are we to judge? If it’s not
dangerous, than whose life are you endangering? That
was a tough case because if everybody really agreed to
it, I was not endangering anyone’s life. This baby
would have an unusual start, but would presumably
have a stable home and everything else would be
okay. [MD#2]
Nonetheless, in the end, this doctor refused because
the request still didn’t feel instinctively “right”:
It was a non-verbal, personal kind of decision. I said,
“No. It’s our policy not to work with old couples,”
but that was a cop-out — although ultimately that
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was the problem. Producing babies for a couple that
was that old, with no realistic expectation that either
one of them would be around, was not right! We
discussed it, and all decided we were uncomfortable.
[MD#2]
Clinician may thus decide, not based on explicit ana-
lyses per se, but on their personal “comfort.” Providers
may also consult each other on such thorny cases. Pro-
viders may refuse to offer treatment because of an initial
non-verbal response, and then search for a reason that
may not in fact fit the specific case precisely, but seem
to serve as a legitimate excuse.
Factors Involved
A range of factors, including personal and political atti-
tudes and beliefs, professional characteristics, institutional
structures and financial motives can shape whether and
how much providers will support such requests. Multiple
reasons can be involved — pro and con. Providers could
simply respect and follow the patient’s autonomy and
wishes, but may also consider the best interests of the fu-
ture progeny. The proposed arrangement could be diffi-
cult for the child, blurring familial roles in ways that, this
physician felt, lay too far outside perceived norms. About
the case above, involving elderly prospective parents, the
physician continued,
It would still be traumatic for the child, who would be
raised by the grandparents for as long as they could
do it, and then the child would go back to the de
facto mother — the daughter. [MD#2]
This physician then drew on his staff ’s feelings and
perceptions of social norms.
That didn’t make any sense to me. So I’m producing
a child for a mom sired by her father. I thought it
stepped outside the norm. [MD#2]
Clinics may vary in their decisions, partly due to differ-
ent views of norms concerning parenting arrangements,
which are changing, though not necessarily equally
throughout the country. Instead, attitudes can vary by
geographic region, fueling inter-clinic differences. As a
male physician said, “Another practice does all kinds of
alternative family building pathways; but we’re a pretty
buttoned-up practice.” [MD#9]
Providers’ own financial motives may also play roles,
balanced against degrees of possible ethical concern. As
a female nurse said, “In some cases, it’s all about the
money. They’ll do pretty much anything as long as
somebody pays for it. Those are the practices that make
the big, newsworthy mistakes.” [OP#6]
Who decides
Clinics may vary due partly to who makes these determi-
nations — what their personal and professional roles
are. As mentioned above, some clinics consult formal,
external ethics committees, while others do not. Physi-
cians may discuss such ethically difficult cases with their
staff, formally or informally. Most clinics also draw on
mental health providers (“We get opinions from psy-
chologists” [MD#13]). These assessments can frequently
help in identifying and addressing problematic arrange-
ments. As a female nurse described, “A couple of times
a year, a psych session leads us to not going forward.”
[OP#6] Yet clinics may vary in how, and to what extent
they use such mental health providers. Who decides
may affect what is decided. This nurse also observed, “It
depends on the clinic, and who’s running it, and what
their personal views are.” [OP#6] As she suggests, clini-
cians may also differ in whether and why they will treat
certain cases, and how they and others perceive possible
motives.
Discussion
These data, the first to examine several critical aspects
of how providers experience, view and make decisions
about unconventional reproductive arrangements, sug-
gest that clinicians face several dilemmas concerning
both the process and content of these decisions —
whether to treat such cases, who should decide, and
how. These requests fall across a wide spectrum from
acceptable to problematic, varying along several parame-
ters, based on the patients’ respective functional roles
(from donating gametes to carrying the fetus to raising
the child), relationships (from biologically-related family
members, to non-biologically related family members, to
friends) and perceived norms. These combinations differ
in certain regards, but also pose similar ethical chal-
lenges, involving blurry and confusing roles, questions
about the ongoing welfare of the unborn child, and un-
anticipated and unfamiliar questions about how to weigh
the competing moral, personal, social and scientific con-
cerns involved.
While ASRM guidelines address a few aspects of these
issues, these data highlight several additional critical sets
of challenges and ambiguities, and make several contri-
butions to the existing literature. While Gerrits et al.
[18], Ehrich et al. [15] and Frith et al. [19] focused on as-
pects of ethical decision-making in one Dutch, one UK,
and essentially five UK clinics, respectively, the present
data examined a wider range of clinics, and suggest consid-
erable variations among both clinics and countries, in how
they approach these issues. Infertility clinics in the US and
many other countries are far less regulated than in the UK
and the Netherlands. The Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Authority (HFEA) regulations, for instance, may
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constrain clinics far more than do guidelines and reg-
ulations in many other countries [30], including the
US, where ASRM guidelines are often looser and less
unenforced [14].
These data also reveal differences in who makes these
decisions. Many of these clinics lack formal ethics com-
mittees, and providers wrestle with these issues, making
decisions on their own, or occasionally consulting with
other physicians or staff, engaging in processes that
range from formal to informal, and vary based partly on
the size and nature of the practice (e.g., whether affili-
ated with a hospital or not). These data suggest that
many clinics unaffiliated with hospitals may have more
informal decision-making processes.
Thus, while Frith et al. [19] see ethical issues dichot-
omously as “settled” vs. “controversial”, with providers
drawing boundaries between these two domains, the
present data highlight other critical aspects of these issues.
Certain ethical questions may appear “settled” in several
clinics in the UK, but may remain more “controversial”
elsewhere. Wide differences may also exist between clinics
— especially in countries with less regulation. Ehrich et al.
[15], for instance, argues that in the one UK clinic they
observed, sex selection of embryos for nonmedical rea-
sons remained very contentious, even though HFEA
had banned it [30]. Hence, examination of which issues
remain controversial and why, and how providers ad-
dress them is critical.
Moreover, certain ethical issues, though seen as “set-
tled” by providers, as Firth et al. suggest [19], can none-
theless pose a wide range of difficulties. Informed
consent, for instance, may be seen as “mundane” — a
mere formality — but in fact raise many challenges con-
cerning definitions and applications of “voluntariness” in
particular situations. Though the need for informed con-
sent may be “settled”, obtaining it adequately with spe-
cific patients can still pose dilemmas — e.g., regarding
how thorough it needs to be. Providers may thus face
challenges regarding not only what to do ethically, but
exactly how to do it. In unconventional IVF arrange-
ments, family members’ complete voluntariness is cru-
cial, but can be hard to assess. Individuals may agree,
but still seem reluctant. While ASRM addresses needs to
prevent undue influence, pressure and coercion, the
current data highlight difficulties entailed. Voluntariness
is complex and multi-faceted, varying along a spectrum
[31], and can be inherently hard to gauge [32], shaped
by not only undue influence, but subtler cultural expec-
tations. Pressures from friends or family, for instance,
may be more perceived than real, but still mold deci-
sions. Decision-making often involves persuasion and
influences from others that need not invalidate volun-
tariness [31]. While coercion has been defined as a
“threat” [33], other, deeply personal feelings and beliefs
may exist about implicit as well as explicit obligations to
family members, strongly affected by cultural values and
expectations. Family members may agree to unusual
procreative arrangements due not to threats or overt
pressure, but to deeply-instilled internal senses of
duty, and patients from other cultures may view these
issues differently.
The current data thus highlight needs to probe not
just the process of how ethically-sensitive issues are dealt
with in general, but the specific content of these ethical
issues — what specific types of controversial cases arise,
of what they consist, why they are controversial, what
specific ethical tensions are involved, and how providers
perceive and address these, and may differ in doing so
based on various personal and professional factors.
Ever-widening ART demand, use and types, changing
social and culture mores, and mounting costs of buying
gametes will doubtlessly make such unconventional ar-
rangements ever-more logistically possible and finan-
cially advantageous for patients, confronting providers
with more types and numbers of such unanticipated
clinical situations.
Ehrich et al. showed that providers face grey areas, but
questions then arise regarding how clinicians in fact re-
solve these. The current data suggest that providers may
do so by undergoing various psychological processes,
shifting from an initial “gut reaction” to more careful
considerations of the ethical principles involved. Pro-
viders do not always know in advance how to evaluate
or weigh these issues. While Gerrits and Ehrich ob-
served meetings, but did not interview providers indi-
vidually, the current data, based on in-depth interviews,
suggest how clinicians may personally feel uncertain,
and undergoing complex personal, emotional and moral,
not just cognitive processes. Providers may at first auto-
matically feel that these prospective combinations violate
mores and are unethical. By definition, these combina-
tions, made possible by relatively new technologies, are
not traditional, making them unfamiliar, and hence not
the “norm” (i.e., what is commonly done), prompting cli-
nicians’ initial moral discomfort (e.g., “yuck”). Yet certain
arrangements may not be the norm, but still be ethical.
In the past, for instance, many providers felt that “gut
feelings” justified not treating gay, lesbian, transgender
or single patients; but many clinicians came later to alter
their attitudes. Mores and ethos (what is generally done)
can differ from morals and ethics (what one should do).
Many clinicians may thus at first feel that such arrange-
ments do not “smell right”, and only subsequently, if
ever, more fully and explicitly consider the issues, care-
fully analyzing the ethical principles involved.
In general, individuals can, psychologically, feel bodily
disgust or discomfort that they rapidly apply to social
situations [34]. Incest taboos, for instance, have ongoing
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psychological potency, even when they do not in fact
apply [35]. Consequently, providers may initially feel that
a request involves combinations of gametes from con-
sanguineous individuals when that is not in fact the case.
In certain situations, feelings of revulsion can be evolu-
tionarily adaptive (e.g., permitting rapid decisions about
threatening situations). When faced with uncertainty, in-
dividuals often make fast, emotional and instinctive deci-
sions, rather than slow, logical and conscious ones [36].
But some providers might simply follow their emotional
impulses without reflection, withholding treatments
from patients who should, arguably, receive care. Over
time, mores, and hence feelings of discomfort will surely
continue to evolve among providers, patients, and much
of society-at-large, underscoring the importance of cli-
nicians being able to think through each of these
types of combinations.
While Frith et al. [19] found that providers, when
asked if they could name any “ethical issues” could not
do so, the current data suggest that clinicians may feel
personally troubled and “uncomfortable” by issues that
they do not explicitly label as “ethical,” but that indeed
embody underlying ethical tensions, generating this dis-
comfort – e.g., balancing patients’ autonomy vs. possible
future risks to the unborn child. Future research on pro-
viders’ views and decisions regarding ethical issues
should thus ask providers about not just “ethical issues”
they face, but clinical situations that make them feel
“uncomfortable”. Future research should also interview,
not just observe clinicians wrestling with ethical issues
to understand the ways providers themselves perceive
and make these decisions, and the prevalence, validity,
reliability and mutability of “gut” feelings in ART as well
as other medical decisions.
The current data also contribute to the past literature
by suggesting several specific types of clinical situations
that can pose dilemmas. While the prior literature has
mentioned a few types of unconventional parental ar-
rangements, primarily involving intrafamilial genetically-
related third parties [4–6], the present data suggest that
difficulties can arise concerning unusual combinations of
social relationships as well (e.g., friends or ex-partners),
and that clinicians may feel concerns about not only
creating children, but raising them as well. Patients
may also present difficult scenarios not only initially,
but overtime, altering their plans after starting treat-
ment, and posing such dilemmas only later. While pa-
tients described by Gerrits et al. were all established
couples [18], those in the present study often were
not, and instead had complex relationships that them-
selves raised ethical questions, underscoring needs to
examine not only which specific procedures are re-
quested (e.g., gender testing or sex selection), but
who is requesting them.
Regarding ethical principles, while Ehrich et al. argued
that “relational autonomy” [15] may be a more suitable
model than individual autonomy, the current data high-
light how providers in fact consider not just the auton-
omy of a single patient, but the autonomy, rights and
well-being of others, as well as other principles, includ-
ing potential risks and benefits. Though many physicians
in various fields prioritize the autonomy of the individual
patient, unconventional combinations of parents may in-
volve four or more people — not only one patient, but
frequently a spouse, and third party (e.g., family member
or friend donating gametes, carrying the fetus, and/or
raising the child) — and the future child. Indeed, a full
bioethical framework, as described by Beauchamp and
Childress, includes four essential principles, all of which
need to be considered, depending on the specific case: not
only autonomy (i.e., the rights of all parties involved), but
beneficence and nonmaleficence (e.g., the benefits and
risks to each of the individuals involved), and social justice
(e.g., not unfairly discriminating against certain groups
such as gay men, lesbians single parents by choice) [37].
Providers should thus try to think through each case care-
fully, analyzing whether and how each of these four basic
principles apply, to arrive at logical, rigorous and consist-
ent ethical responses. Yet the autonomy, rights and best
interests of the individuals involved can be hard to assess
and/or can conflict. Frith et al. [19] and Gerrits et al. [18]
point out, for instance, that providers are concerned about
the welfare of the child, but the present data highlight
how clinicians may view, assess and weigh the child’s wel-
fare against these other concerns in a variety of ways that
differ, based on the particular type of case. Questions arise,
too, of the professional responsibilities of providers, since
infertility treatments may not involve a “disease” per se,
but are, arguably, more “elective”.
These data have several implications for clinical practice,
highlighting the importance of clinicians being as sensitive
as possible to these issues, ensuring that potential donors
understand both that they indeed have a choice, and that
providers could decline on potential donors’ behalf to po-
tential gamete recipients, offering alternative reasons.
These findings underscore, too, the benefits of formal eth-
ics committees. Providers who refuse to treat cases that
colleagues may feel are ethical, should consider referring
these patients to such colleagues. However, how often
such referrals occur is unknown. If declining to provide
treatment, clinicians must decide, too, what exactly to tell
the patient — how to explain and justify these decisions.
These data also suggest that providers may benefit from
ethics training on how to assess these dilemmas systemat-
ically, applying and weighing relevant ethical principles, as
outlined earlier.
The data also have key implications for future guide-
lines. Current guidelines in the US and in many other
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countries do not address several critical questions that
arise clinically, leaving many ambiguities, and are thus of
limited assistance to providers. For instance, while
ASRM recommends “separate interviews and counseling
of the involved parties,” [3] the present data underscore
how these interactions can still pose challenges. Indeed,
studies of living kidney donors show that only 42% of
transplant programs disclosed all elements of informed
consent to prospective organ donors, and only 30% dis-
cussed long-term risks [38]; and of these donors, 40%
felt pressure to donate — that their families “expected”
them to do so — though being given both opportunities
to alter their decision, and confidentiality concerning
their reasons for declining [39]. Nevertheless, despite
such familial expectations to donate, potential donors
can nonetheless decide voluntarily that they indeed wish
to do so [31]. Donation of organs differs from that of
eggs or sperm; organ donation is generally more inva-
sive, but illuminates the complexities that can be in-
volved. ASRM could potentially address exactly how
much proof of informed consent and voluntariness is
needed. Guidelines for organ transplantation, for in-
stance, recommend a 2-week “cooling off” period before
surgery, to give donors time to fully weigh all the issues,
though only 11% of programs require this period [40].
ASRM could similarly add to its guidelines that, espe-
cially when questions arise about informed consent, phy-
sicians should allow donors several days to carefully
consider these decisions.
While ASRM states that “Child-to-parent arrangements
are generally unacceptable, and parent-to-child arrange-
ments are acceptable in limited situations” [3], questions
emerge — e.g., whether the guidelines should change to
stipulate that such arrangements should in fact “always,”
rather than “generally” be prohibited; and if not, what ex-
ceptions are permissible, and how these should be deter-
mined, especially given concerns about informed consent.
ASRM states that doctors may decline to provide treat-
ment “on the basis of well-substantiated judgments that
those patients will be unable to provide minimally ad-
equate or safe care for offspring”; and that practices
“should develop written policies and procedures for mak-
ing determinations to withhold services on the basis of
concerns about the child-rearing capacities of prospective
patients” [41]. But how these judgements are or should be
made is unclear. ASRM states that providers can reject
gestational carriers due to “current marital or relationship
instability” [42], but dilemmas arise of exactly how stable
relationships, for parents as well, need to be.
Guidelines can address, too, arragements of friends
and other social relationships, appropriate roles of physi-
cians’ financial motives in these decisions, and how
much providers should consider child-raising. Though
ASRM has recommended that clinics develop written
policies and procedures, questions remain regarding
whether and how exactly providers do, and should
proceed.
These findings highlight needs, too, for future research
to investigate these views and experiences further among
larger samples — e.g., how often clinicians confront each
of these various types of arrangements, and agree or refuse
treatment; how they decide and why; how often and in
what ways clinics in fact develop written policies and pro-
cedures; what these policies say; how often providers
follow these; when and how often providers balance emo-
tional disgust vs. ethical principles; what clinicians say to
patients when refusing to offer treatment; how often pro-
viders then refer these patients elsewhere; and what fac-
tors (e.g., provider age, gender, training, religion, and
geographic location) affect clinicians’ decisions. ASRM
should encourage, and the Society for Assisted Reproduct-
ive Technology can facilitate or encourage collection of
data addressing at least some of these vital questions.
These data have implications, too, for understanding
how clinicians make ethical decisions in medicine more
broadly — e.g., when else providers draw on the “yuck”
response, whether and how often they simply follow, or
instead evaluate this response, how they assess it (e.g.,
using what criteria), and with what results.
The present data shed important light as well on recent
questions concerning the interrelationships between re-
search in bioethics and in moral and cognitive psychology
[14, 19]. The current data suggest that critical questions
emerge concerning when exactly individuals, in this case
physicians, change from “fast” to “slow” thinking about
complex moral issues — how long this change takes, and
what factors, if any, may facilitate or impede it. These data
thus suggest a research agenda these data — to examine
whether individuals are able to overcome feelings of disgust
regarding untraditional combinations of parents or other
ethically controversial areas of medicine, and if so, how and
when; and whether competing financial or other factors
counter such “yuck” responses, and if so, how much. Fur-
ther studies can probe, too, whether, over time, feelings of
disgust lessen, disappear, co-exist, are wholly reversed (such
that individuals instead come to follow "slow" thinking),
or are merely countered by other considerations (e.g., “I
still disapprove of certain behaviors, but will benefit finan-
cially, and will thus accept them”). Investigators can
explore how feelings of disgust are related to final treat-
ment decisions — whether the outcomes of “fast” thinking
(e.g.., disgust) that individuals overcome differ from the
outcomes of “slow” thinking, and whether aspects of the
controversial treatment itself matter. Researchers can
examine, for instance, how providers and the general pub-
lic view potential unconventional parenting combina-
tions— how many and which respondents would offer
treatment, and how “yuck” responses vary in strength.
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These data have several possible limitations. The sam-
ple size is adequate for qualitative studies designed to
identify key themes and issues that appear, but not for
statistically analyzing how various groups differ (e.g.,
male vs. female physicians, or mental health vs. other
providers); however, further research can probe using
domains with more participants. Still, clinicians, in par-
ticular, are very busy and increasingly difficult to recruit
for research [43, 44]. Difficulty recruiting larger numbers
of provides doubtlessly contributes to the lack of previ-
ous research on these key areas, and to the value of the
current data. These data also arguably have as well a cer-
tain face validity in elucidating the challenges that many
clinicians confront,.
Conclusions
These interviews shed vital light on how clinicians con-
front critical dilemmas and make decisions about
whether to treat unusual familial combinations of pa-
tients using ART; and have important implications for
enhancing practice, policies, education and research.
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